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Abstract. In this note I analyze situations where an entrepreneur needs
external nancing from an outside investor in order to start an investment
project that will yield a prot for two consecutive periods. The value of
second-period prot is the entreprneurs private information. I show that
the choice of nancing mode can be transformed into an optimal stochastic
bounded control problem, where the state variable t represents the investors
rst-period payo¤ and the control variable  can be interpreted in terms of
the investors residual prot rights. I then show that under certain general
conditions such as the monotonicity and continuity of t (which have clear
economic interpretations), an optimal contract is characterized by maximal
 under low values of t and minimal  under high values of t. In economic
terms this corresponds to debt.
1 Introduction
In this note I analyze situations in which a wealth-constrained entrepreneur
needs nancing from an outside investor in order to start an investment
project. In their famous proposition Modigliani and Miller (1958) established
that when markets are perfect, the choice of nancing mode plays no role. In
practice however, the irrelevance of nancial decisions is not observed. One
of the most intriguing challenges in this eld has been to explain why debt
contracting and accordingly debt-like securities such as deposit certicates,
bonds, bills of exchange, etc. play such important roles in nancing.
I assume that the entrepreneur possesses private information regarding
the rms prot. Nachman and Noe (1994) resolved the problem of optimal
nancing in a one-period environment with asymmetric information. My
analysis involves a two-period model and, in contrast to existing literature,
there is asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the investor in terms of
future prot, while the distribution of rst-period prot is common to both.
When the prot generated by the project is a continuous variable, the
choice of nancing can be described as a stochastic optimization problem,
wherein the unknown function represents the payo¤ to the investor. Fur-
thermore, I show that the entrepreneurs problem is an optimal bounded
control problem and that it is equivalent to minimizing the expected value of
the control variable  for a given average value of t, where t represents the
rst-period payo¤ to the investor and  can be interpreted in terms of its
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second-period prot rights. The reason for minimizing  stems from the fact
that the asymmetric information pertains to the second period, and thus by
minimizing the investors residual rights the entrepreneur can mitigate the
adverse selection problem. This problem can in turn be transformed into
a stochastic bounded control problem with an isoparametric constraint (see
Kamien and Schwartz, 1981). Consequently I show that under certain gen-
eral conditions such as monotonicity and continuity of t (which have clear
economic interpretations), an optimal contract would have maximal  under
low values of t and minimal  under high values of t. In economic terms this
corresponds to debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model; Section 3 shows results obtained regarding the optimality of debt;
Section 4 discusses assumptions made by this paper and Section 5 contains
the conclusions.
2 Model.
Consider a rm that has to make an investment b > 0. There is no cash or
assets in place available and therefore the rm needs external nancing from
an outside investor. The rms owner (the entrepreneur) and the investor
are risk neutral. In period 1, the rms cash ow is r 2 [0; r] with the
distribution function F (r) and density function f(r), which are common
knowledge. Except the cash, after the liquidation there are some assets which
represent specic investments and which can not be sold immediately after
the liquidation.1 However they yield the revenue c in the second period. c
can either be ch with probability p or cl with probability 1 p, ch > cl > 0. p
is common knowledge. Before issuing securities and making investments, the
entrepreneur receives private information about the value of c, which is not
available to the investor. All available cash is distributed to the claimholders
according to issued securities immediately after the liquidation. At the same
time the parties should establish the property rights on the remaining assets
(RR).
First-period prot does not cover the cost of investment, while the total
projects NPV is positive for each rm, i. e.
Er < b < Er + cj; j = l; h (1)
1See Hart (1995) about the relationship-specic investments.
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where E denotes mathematical expectation. From (1) the parties cannot
write short-term (one-period) nancing contract in order to avoid asymmetric
information problems in the second period.
The investors contract is [t(r); (r)], where t(r) is his rst-period payo¤,
(r) is his RR (accordingly (r)c is his residual payo¤). From a practical
point of view, the property rights (r) should be established immediately
after liquidation and thus cannot be contingent on c. The typical argument
in the literature is that complete contracts determining the residual payo¤s
in any state of nature are impossible to write.2 This is especially true for
after-liquidation activities which are very di¢ cult to describe ex-ante. Hence
the residual owner(s) should be determined. Since all available cash is im-
mediately distributed after liquidation, we can write:
tE(r) = r   t(r);8r (2)
E(r) = 1  (r);8r (3)
where tE(r) is the entrepreneurs rst-period payo¤ and E(r) is his RR.
Let us assume:
(i) t(r) and tE(r) are monotone increasing functions from [0; r] into [0; r].
(ii)
(r) = t0(r) (4)
if t0(r) exists.
Most known securities correspond to this rule (see Section 4 for a discus-
sion).
Note that assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that
0  (r)  1;8r (5)
if t0(r) exists. This in turn together with assumption (i) implies limited
liability for the parties (the payo¤s are non-negative) in both periods (see
Innes (1990) for a discussion).
(iii) The distribution function F follows increasing hazard-rate condi-
tion(IHRC), i. e. f=(1  F ) is increasing in r.
Given (2), (3) and (4), the security design can be fully described by the
investors rst-period payo¤ t(r). Let the game be as follows:
1. The type of the entrepreneur (h or l) is revealed.
2See, for example, Hart (1995).
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2. He chooses a nancial contract t(r) and proposes this contract to the
investor in exchange for an amount b.
3. The investor accepts or rejects the o¤er. If the investor rejects the
o¤er, the entrepreneurs payo¤ equals zero. If the investor accepts, the en-
trepreneur issues the securities contracted above and invests b.
4. First-period prot r is realized. The investors rst-period payo¤ is
t(r) and that of the entrepreneur is r   t(r). RR become known: t0(r) for
the investor and 1  t0(r) for the entrepreneur.
5. Second-period benet c is realized. The investors second-period payo¤
is t
0
(r)c and the entrepreneurs (1  t0(r))c.
The entrepreneur maximizes his expected payo¤. Since there are no assets
in place available and no other opportunities for the entrepreneur, limited
liability implies that the entrepreneur will always do better by investing.
The investor will accept the contract if his expected payo¤ is at least b.
Throughout this article, I use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria and
also verify that o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive usual renements like Cho and
Kreps(1987) intuitive criterion. If several equilibria exist then the solution
is determined by minimizing the mispricing for undervaluing type.3 Which
contract is optimal for the entrepreneur?
If information about the rms type is symmetric, then the optimal con-
tract for the entrepreneur of type j can be given by any contract t(r) such that
the investors budget constraint is binding in equilibrium: E[t(r)+ t0(r)cj] =
b. The entrepreneurs payo¤will in this case be: E[r  t(r)+ (1  t0(r))cj] =
Er + cj   b (rst-best output).
3 The solution of the game with asymmetric
information.
The outline of the solution is as follows. Intuitively, the solution is pooling
equilibrium, given that a low-prot type l mimic always a high-prot type
h. Which pooling minimizes mispricing for h? The basis of mispricing is
asymmetric information relative to further prot. The idea is that the op-
timal contract should be one that minimizes the average investors RR and
maximizes his average rst-period revenue. In this case mispricing would be
minimal. Another point is that debt is the contract that provides maximal
3See, for instance, Nachman and Noe (1994).
5
slope under low values of r. Given the continuity of the contracts this allows
to reach high payments for relatively low values of r comparatively to other
contracts and support these high payments without increasing slope for high
values of r. This minimizes the average slope of the investors contract.
Let Wj(t) represent the type j entrepreneurs expected total payo¤ given
the investors contract t (if accepted) and W (t; ) be the investors expected
payo¤ given the contract t and the probability  that the rm is type h.
Obviously:
Wj(t) = E(r   t(r) + (1  t0(r)ci) (6)
W (t; ) = (Et(r) + t0(r)ch) + (1  )(Et(r) + t0(r)cl) (7)
From (6) and (7) we get
Wh(t) = Er + ch  W (t; 1) (8)
and
Wl(t) = Er + cl  W (t; 0) (9)
The equations (8) and (9) correspond to the case of symmetric informa-
tion.
Lemma 1. W (t; ) is increasing in .
Proof. Follows immediately from (7) and ch > cl. End proof.
This lemma has two following important implications.
Lemma 2. The investor would accept (on equilibrium path or out-of)
any contract t such as W (t; 0) = b.
Proof. According to lemma 1, the investors payo¤observing the contract
t is minimized if the type is l (which corresponds to the case  = 0). If in
this case the investors payo¤ is b, the investor will accept. End proof.
Lemma 3. The type l is never undervalued in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that l is undervalued in
equilibrium or thatWl(t) < Er+cl b. Then l would deviate in any contract
described in lemma 2. Since this contract will be accepted, we get from (9)
that the payo¤ of l would be Er + cl   b. End proof.
6
The following exercise is crucial in this article. Suppose that the investor
accept any contract t such that W (t; )  b for some given . What is the
best contract for type h?
Lemma 4. Consider the following optimization problem: maxt(r)Wh(t)
under the constraint: W (t; )  b. The solution to this problem is debt.
Proof. By denition of debt, we should show that the solution has the
form t(r) = minfr; rg for some given r.4 First, t is continuous and di¤er-
entiable almost everywhere and
t(0) = 0 (10)
0  t0()  1 (11)
For continuity see Harris and Raviv (1988, lemma 1). If a monotone
function is continuous, it must be di¤erentiable almost everywhere.5 The
condition (10) follows from assumption (i) considering r = 0. The condition
(11) follows from the assumption (ii) and the condition (5). Now present this
problem in the form of an optimal control problem. This is:
maxt()
Z r
0
[r   t(r) + ch(1  t0(r))]f(r)dr
subject to:
E[t(r) + t0(r)ch] + (1  )E[t(r) + t0(r)cl]  b (12)
t(0) = 0 (13)
0  t0(r)  1;8r (14)
Given the condition (14), this is an optimal bounded control program (see,
for example, Kamien and Schwarz, 1981). We can simplify this problem to
the following:
mint()
Z r
0
(t(r) + cht
0(r))f(r)dr
4r denotes debt face value.
5This is Lebesgues theorem. See, for instance, Kolmogorov and Fomin (1998, p.321).
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subject to:
Et(r) + AEt0(r)  b (15)
t(0) = 0
0  t0(r)  1;8r
where A = ch + (1   )cl. The equation (15) is bounded in equilibrium.6
Thus, we can write
Et(r) = b  AEt0(r)
We can further simplify the objective function to:
mint()[b  AEt0(r) +
Z r
0
cht
0(r)f(r)dr],
mint()[b+ (1  )(ch   cl)Et0(r)]
We can then rewrite the optimization problem as:
mint()Et0(r)
Et(r) + AEt0(r) = b (16)
t(0) = 0
0  t0(r)  1;8r
In order to solve this problem that contains isoparametric constraints (16), we
will transform our problem into one with an end-point constraint. Inducing
new variable y : y0(r) = t(r)f(r) + At0(r)f(r) allows us to transform the
isoparametric constraints into an end-point constraint because the equation
(16) is equivalent to y(r) = b. Our problem can be further transformed in
this way:
mint(r);y(r);(r)
Z r
0
(r)f(r)dr
6Suppose that the contract t(r) is optimal and (15) is not bounded. Let R = max(r j
t(r) = 0). Consider the contract T (r) = 0 if r  R + " and T (r) = (1   ")t(r); if
r > R+". It corresponds to the assumption (i) and betters the objective function because
T (r)  t(r) and T 0(r)  t0(r);8r where both inequlities are strict for some r with positive
mesure. It decreases the left side of (15). Therefore, by making " su¢ ciently small, the
better contract is achieved.
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t(0) = 0 (17)
t0 =  (18)
0    1 (19)
y0 = tf + Af (20)
y(0) = 0 (21)
y(r) = b (22)
Further, we can use standard optimization techniques. Hamiltonian is:
H = f+1+2[tf+Af ] where 1 - is a co-state variable associated with
(18) and, 2 - is co-state variable associated with (20). Associated Lagrangian
is: L = H w1 w2(1 ) where w1 and w2 are two multipliers associated
with double-inequality (19). The optimal solution satises:
1. The Pontryagin principle with regard to control variable :
L = f + 1 + 2Af   w1 + w2 = 0 (23)
2. The Euler equations: 1) 02 =  @L@y ,
02 = 0 (24)
and 2) 01 =  @L@t ,
2f =  10 (25)
3. The Kuhn-Tukker conditions:
w1  0; w2  0; w1 = 0; w2(1  ) = 0 (26)
4. The transversality condition (Kamien and Scwartz, 1981, p.148): 1)
H 0(r) = 0 which implies:
1(r) = 0 (27)
These conditions allow us to solve the problem. The equation (24) implies:
2 = D (28)
Substituting this in (25) and integrating it gives:
DF (r) +K =  1 (29)
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where K is determined by using condition (27):
K =  D (30)
Finally:
1 =  DF (r) +D (31)
Thus: H(r)  f+1+2Af = f(r) DF (r)+D+DAf(r). The equations
(23) and (26) imply:
H(r) < 0) w2 > 0)  = 1 (32)
and:
H(r) > 0) w1 < 0)  = 0 (33)
and:
H(r) = 0) w1 = w2 = 0)  2 [0; 1] (34)
Let us suppose that 1 + DA < 0. This is only possible if D < 0. But in
this case, H(r) would be negative everywhere, which is impossible. Thus
1 +DA > 0. In order to determine the sign of H, the following inequality
is crucial:
f(r)
1  F (r) >;=; <  
D
1 +DA
(35)
If f(r)
1 F (r) >   D1+DA =)  = 0. From assumption (iii) f(r)1 F (r) is increasing.
Thus if D
1+DA
>  f(0) then  = 0 everywhere which is impossible. Thus
D
1+DA
<  f(0). In this case, H must change its sign only once. Let this
point be r. We now have: H(r) < 0; r  r and H(r)  0; r > r: This
implies  = 1; r  r and  = 0; r > r, making debt the solution. End
proof.
Lemma 3 allows us to establish the following result about pooling with
debt.
Proposition 1. Let td be a debt contract such that:
W (td; p) = b (36)
There exists a pooling equilibrium characterized by the following conditions:
1) both types play td; 2) o¤-equilibrium investor belief  observing certain
contracts t is as follows: if
W (t; 0) < W (td; 0) (37)
10
then  = 0; if
W (t; 0) > W (td; 0) (38)
then  = 1; if
W (t; 0) = W (td; 0)
then any beliefs are possible.
If pooling equilibrium with t 6= td exists when the mispricing under that
is greater than under pooling with td:
Proof. Consider pooling with td. 1) l does not deviate in another contract.
The only incentives for l to deviate to some t occur when:
Wl(t) > Wl(td)
Given equ. (9) this is equivalent to:
W (t; 0) < W (td; 0)
However, all such contracts would not be accepted by the investor. The
conditions (36), (37) and lemma 1 imply
W (t; 0) < W (td; 0) < W (td; p) = b (39)
2) h does not deviate. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that h deviates,
meaning there exists t1(r) accepted by the investor such that:
W (t1; 1) < W (td; 1) (40)
Let us look at the following optimization problem:
mint(r)W (t; 1)
subject to:
W (t; 0)  W (td; 0) (41)
We can apply lemma 4. This is because given the equation (8)mint(r)W (t; 1)
is equivalent to maxt(r)Wh(t); in the condition (12) we can take  = 0 and
instead of b to use W (td; 0). The solution to this problem t2 is a debt con-
tract. Evidently the interest rate for this contract would not be less than it
is for td because the condition (41) implies W (t2; 0)  W (td; 0). This in turn
implies W (t2; )  W (td; );8. Given (40) we can write:
W (t2; 1)  W (td; 1) > W (t1; 1)
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This is a contradiction because if it is true, t2 is not the solution for the
described optimization problem. Since t1 is accepted by the investor then,
according to our systems description for o¤-equilibrium beliefs, we should
have:
W (t1; 0)  W (td; 0)
(if not then the contract is not accepted: see (39)) and thus t1(r) satises
(41) and is better than t2(r); 3) Out-o¤ equilibrium beliefs satisfy Cho and
Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion. For the case (37) the investor belief that the
type is l is reasonable because the potential deviation of l may be protable
for him. Now, in the case (38), the investor sets the probability zero on the
type l because he will never deviate to such a contract.
Let us analyze the last part of the proposition. Consider the following
optimization problem:
maxt(r)Wh(t)
subject to:
W (t; p)  b
The condition (36) and lemma 4 imply that td is the solution to this prob-
lem (other debt contracts would have higher interest rates). Now suppose
that there exists another pooling equilibrium, with ta being di¤erent from
that described above and with smaller mispricing for h, i.e.
Wh(td)  Wh(ta) (42)
Obviously,
W (ta; p)  b
But in this case, (42) contradict the fact that td is the solution to the de-
scribed above optimization problem. End Proof.
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a pooling equilibrium with debt
and describes completely this equilibrium. In particular, the investors par-
ticipation constraint is binding and o¤-equilibrium beliefs are such that if
some contract gives the investor less than debt for type l, the investor is pes-
simistic about this contract and does not accept it. While if the payo¤ for
some contract even for a low-protable type is larger than in equilibrium,
the investor believes that this is a high-protable type and the investor ac-
cepts this contract. The condition (37) insures that very bad contracts will
not be accepted and type l will not deviate, while the condition (38) together
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with lemma 1 insures that type h does not deviate. If it does deviate, bring-
ing into existence some more e¢ cient contract, this contract will also be debt
because even the best contract among those satisfying (38) (which is debt
according to lemma 4 but with di¤erent interest rates) cannot be better than
td.
Finally consider separating equilibria.
Proposition 2. If separating equilibrium exists then the mispricing under
that contract is greater than under pooling with td:
Proof. Consider any separating equilibrium and let th and tl be the equi-
librium contracts. Since equilibrium is separating we should have W (tl; 0) 
b. From lemma 2 the investor accepts any contract with W (t; 0) = b. So in
equilibrium it should be W (tl; 0) = b (if not l will deviate). The incentive
constraint for non-deviation of l to the contract th is Wl(th) < Er + cl   b.
Given (8) this is equivalent to
W (th; 0) > b (43)
Consider the following optimization problem:
mint(r)W (t; 1)
subject to:
W (t; 0)  b (44)
Here once again we can apply lemma 4. This is because mint(r)W (t; 1) is
equivalent to maxt(r)Wh(t) given the equation (8); we can take  = 0. The
solution to this problem t
0
h is a debt contract. First, note that Wh(t
0
h) 
Wh(th). This is because th satises (44): if not, l will deviate to th. Second,
the interest rate corresponding to t
0
h is not less than for td. This follows from
the fact that (44) is a stricter condition than (12). This follows from lemma
1. Finally: Wh(td)  Wh(t0h)  Wh(th). End proof.
The result of this analyses is that pooling equilibrium with debt (with
interest rates such that the investors budget constraint is binding in equilib-
rium) is an equilibrium which survives the renements criterion and which
minimizes mispricing comparatively to other equilibria.
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4 Discussion about assumptions.
1. Increasing hazard-rate condition. An usual assumption in contract the-
ory relative to distribution function is monotone likelihood ratio condition
MLRP (see, for example, Jewitt, 1991). In the security design literature,
some examples of using this condition can be found in Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994), Innes (1990) and Matthews (2002). It can be shown that
MLRP implies IHRC (see, for example, Wolfstatter, 1999). Thus, compared
to MLRP, IHRC is weaker. Most of the known distribution functions satisfy
IHRC. A well known example in nancial contract literature is Nachman and
Noe (1994).
2. Limited liability. For any type of enforceable contract, the absence of
limited liability is not worth considering because no matter what the prot
realization, payback is always possible and this leads to the possibility of
rst-best. Limited liability is the usual assumption made in the nancial
contract literature that discusses modern forms of business organization (such
as public corporations etc.).
3. Monotonicity. The reasons for the use of the monotonicity condition
were explained by Innes (1990) and Matthews (2002): if the contract is
not monotonic then rst, the entrepreneur can articially increase prots by
borrowing funds on the investor and second, investors are given incentives to
destroy the rms activities.
4. The rule of marginal revenues. By assumption (ii), if the current-
period payo¤ is t(r) then the residual cash-ow rights (residual property
rights) should be t0(r). This is consistent with the standard securities. Take,
for example, non-levered common equity. In this case both the entrepreneurs
and the investors contracts are linear: t(r) = r and tE(r) = (1   )r,
where  shows the part of investors shares in the total number of issued
shares. His property rights (residual cash-ow rights) equals   t0(r) which
is obviously consistent with observed practice (respectively the entrepreneurs
RR are 1     t0E(r)). Lets take a closer look at debt. Suppose that
the investors contract is debt and the entrepreneurs contract is levered
equity: t(r) = minfr; rg and tE(r) = maxf0; r   rg. If a prot is greater
than nominal debt r then the property rights belong to the equityholder
(t0E(r) = 1), and if it is less than the debts nominal value the creditors have
all property rights (t
0
(r) = 1). This is consistent with observed practice
and with theoretical literature on this topic. The same can be shown for
convertible preferred participating equity and for three piece-wise securities
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like convertible preferred equity, for example.
The economic intuition behind this assumption is based on intertempo-
ral substitution activities. Suppose an opposite situation exists where the
decision-makers rst-period marginal revenue is greater than his RR. In this
case, he would marginally increase the rms current prot by decreasing the
rms second period prot, since his share in the rst-period prot increase
is high. Thus, the marginal revenue should serve as a good approximation
for calculating residual prot rights.
5 Conclusion
This note has analyzed optimal nancial contracts in situations where ex-
ante asymmetric information about the rms current prot is symmetric
and that about future prot is asymmetric. Since a contract on total prot
is impossible to write, the standard pecking-order theory (Myers and Ma-
jluf, 1984) does not apply. A contract should then specify state-contingent
current-period payo¤s and residual property rights. I show that the choice of
nancing mode can be transformed into a stochastic bounded control prob-
lem with an isoparametric constraint (see Kamien and Schwartz, 1981). The
analysis reveals that the debt is the optimal contract for the best type. This
generalizes the result of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Nachman and Noe
(1994) about the optimality of debt for one-period environment by taking
into consideration the problem of property rights allocation in the situation
where complete long term contracts are impossible.
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